EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Russia: Obama Trip to Moscow Offers Chance for Better US-Russian Cooperation on Iran

EURASIA INSIGHT

RUSSIA: OBAMA TRIP TO MOSCOW OFFERS CHANCE FOR BETTER US-RUSSIAN COOPERATION ON IRAN
A EurasiaNet commentary by Stephen Blank 7/01/09

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Iran has counted for a long time on Russian and Chinese support to block, or at least mitigate sanctions. Tehran has also looked to Moscow and Beijing for deals concerning hydrocarbon and nuclear energy, as well as arms sales. This support has helped Iran defy the United Nations and the West on the nuclear issue. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

On June 9, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified to Congress that while Russia had publicly denied the existence of an Iranian nuclear and missile threat, officials in Moscow had recently told him that they had come around to see the danger inherent in Tehran’s nuclear program. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. This was not the first time Gates had made such a statement concerning Russia’s position, but this time there was no discernible response from Moscow, unlike on previous occasions.

More tangible evidence of a shift in Russian thinking is found in Moscow’s dealings with Iran in the space and satellite sphere. Until recently, Moscow had been a reliable provider of space and satellite launch services to Tehran. As experts well know, possession of a capability for launching satellites presumes an equal capability to launch long-range ballistic missiles. And again, until recently, Moscow had denied repeatedly that Iran posed a threat. But now Moscow is refusing to launch Iran’s newest satellite.

Russia’s tune changed after Iran launched its Omid satellite in February, an event that confirmed Tehran’s launch capability. Russian military writers who commented on the February launch and on earlier aspects of Iran’s programs were not taken in by Moscow’s denials and sometimes even said so in print. But the February launch was too public a refutation of Russia’s posture.

A second indicator that the Kremlin is reevaluating its position is found in Russia’s recent arms deals with Israel. Recognizing that its unmanned aerial vehicles performed badly during the 2008 war with Georgia, Russia shopped around for new alternatives and found that Israel’s drones were the best on the market. Although the idea of buying weapons from Israel caused vigorous internal debate -- generated in part by the enduring anti-Israel proclivities of key government agencies, and a refusal in some circles to admit that Russia could not produce quality drones -- a deal was signed. But both sides attached conditions.

Russia made clear its desire that Israel stop selling weapons to Georgia and those sales have tapered off. Israel, for its part, probably during former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s visit to Moscow, made clear that the sale by Moscow to Tehran of advanced air-defense missiles, specifically the S-300PMU2 missile, either had to be halted, or Israel would undertake preemptive military action. The missiles could be used to defend against either US or Israeli attacks on Iran’s missile and nuclear sites. Moscow ultimately backed down and agreed not to sell Iran these weapons. While Russia clearly wants to support Iran, it equally clearly does not want another Middle Eastern war.

In yet another indicator, Moscow signed on to the G-8 foreign ministers’ denunciation of Iran’s repression of its demonstrators. While Russia is not generally inclined to denounce election irregularities, it also prizes solidarity among G-8 members, and was clearly sending another signal of its displeasure to Iran.

None of this necessarily means that Russia will support potential US efforts to engage Iran, a possibility that now seems greatly diminished in the wake of the hardliners’ brutal crackdown in Tehran. Neither does it necessarily mean that Moscow will support any new effort to tighten sanctions and pressure upon Tehran. Likewise, the Kremlin can’t be expected to publicly admit that Iran represents a threat to its vital interests.

Still, the upcoming Moscow summit may present the Obama administration with an opportunity to lay the groundwork for closer US-Russian cooperation on Iran. Obama could encourage the Kremlin to take a tougher line toward Tehran by linking such a behavioral change to Moscow’s long-standing desire to block the deployment of anti-missile systems in Central Europe. Obama could also make headway if he can persuade Russian leaders that Iran’s nuclear and missile programs threaten vital Russian interests just as much as they do US interests.

Editor's Note: Stephen Blank is a professor at the US Army War College. The views expressed this article do not in any way represent the views of the US Army, Defense Department or the US Government.