EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Uzbekistan Continues To Drift Away From Russia, But Not Necessarily Toward the West

EURASIA INSIGHT

UZBEKISTAN CONTINUES TO DRIFT AWAY FROM RUSSIA, BUT NOT NECESSARILY TOWARD THE WEST
7/15/08

For those striving to divine the intentions of the Uzbek government, all signs suggest that Russia’s star, from Tashkent’s perspective, is in retrograde. But local experts stress that Uzbekistan’s recent efforts to downgrade relations with Russia are not necessarily a harbinger of a renewed alliance with the United States and European Union.

First signs that Uzbek-Russian relations were growing strained were visible in the spring, when Tashkent made a number of provocative steps against Moscow, from granting hydrocarbon contracts to Russian companies’ rivals to shunning Russian officials and making decisions without consultations with the Kremlin. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Even so, the rhetoric remained rosy. For example, Uzbek President Islam Karimov and his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, were all smiles during their June 6 meeting in St. Petersburg. Medvedev hailed Uzbekistan as the Kremlin’s "key partner in Central Asia," while Karimov insisted that "relations with Russia have always been a priority for Uzbekistan."

"And I am sure that there are no underwater currents that could change that," Karimov added for emphasis back then.

Just over a month later, Karimov’s skill as an oceanographer is coming into question. Despite the statements of eternal friendship, an unmistakable chill has descended upon Uzbek-Russian relations.

In a sure sign of who’s up and who’s down, the Independence Day reception at the US embassy in Tashkent, held on July 3, was attended by a bevy of top-ranking Uzbek government officials, including the senate chairman, parliament’s speaker, the first vice premier, a security council executive and the minister of foreign economic affairs. In sharp contrast, the Independence Day reception at the Russian embassy on June 12 saw only the Uzbek foreign minister’s deputy in attendance.

Another interesting detail is that Uzbekistan was not on the itinerary of Medvedev’s early July swing through Central Asia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Official visits by Medvedev to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are scheduled for late August and early October respectively. Medvedev’s travel agenda marks a drastic departure from that of his predecessor and political patron, Vladimir Putin, who after becoming president chose Uzbekistan as the destination for his first official visit abroad. That trip commenced a thaw that enabled Uzbekistan’s abrupt switch in its geopolitical course in the aftermath of the Andijan events in 2005. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"It is barely a coincidence," a Tashkent-based analyst said, speaking on condition of anonymity and referring to Uzbek-Russian tension. "Either the relations are so good that there is nothing to discuss � or it is a sign that something is wrong. If the relations were good, Medvedev would have even more reasons to come visit � just to make Karimov happy � instead of visiting Astana twice, which will definitely chagrin the Uzbek president."

Some experts believe US and EU willingness to downplay the Andijan events has encouraged Tashkent to distance itself from Russia. US and EU representatives have been trying hard to woo Uzbekistan in recent months. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In June, for example, a steady stream of Western dignitaries passed through the Uzbek capital, including US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office Alexander Stubb and the Mediator of the French Republic Jean-Paul Delevoye. The "honorable guests" tried hard to avoid sensitive topics, such as human rights, and focused on areas of cooperation, like regional security and economic cooperation.

Russia has attempted to offer Tashkent incentives to remain loyal to the Kremlin’s geopolitical agenda. Russia’s state-run energy monopoly, Gazprom, has already offered Uzbekistan "European prices" for its gas, a move that would fill Tashkent’s coffers. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Russian companies have also purchased or invested in major Uzbek businesses. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

It has not been all carrots, though. In what could be considered a warning, the Russian Agriculture Ministry’s certification agency, Rosselkhoznadzor, banned all Uzbek agricultural imports, including cotton, on May 12 citing the supposed presence of a dangerous pest. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The move dealt a serious blow to Tashkent, as agricultural products make up the bulk of Uzbek exports to Russia, worth roughly $2 billion. The threat was especially strong given that many major European businesses banned merchandise containing Uzbek cotton from their shelves amid accusations that Tashkent uses child labor. [For additional information click here].

The Russian ban was eased in late May, before the meeting of the Russian and Uzbek presidents in St. Petersburg, and then lifted completely about a month later, on June 16, as a sign of goodwill, and an incentive to "remain cooperative." Karimov had reportedly sought total immunity for Uzbek exports.

The West has also offered incentives to encourage Tashkent’s cooperation. On June 12, the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors discussed a new Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Uzbekistan. The strategy envisions loans of about $300 million in 2008-2011. [For additional information click here]. The amount under discussion is striking when taking into account that the World Bank has loaned Uzbekistan a total of about $600 million since 1991.

Meanwhile, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is intensifying its activity in Uzbekistan. Most recently, on June 18, the agency launched a three-year Aglinks Project that will work with over 1,100 farms, as well as several large agribusinesses, "to improve the efficiency of the fruit and vegetable sector in Uzbekistan." Over half of Uzbekistan’s population resides in rural areas, with agriculture providing a majority of jobs in those areas.

Such economic incentives are not paired with civil society demands, such as requirements to improve the government’s human rights record or to implement reforms. Despite this, both Western and Uzbek officials are quick to acknowledge that substantial obstacles continue to impede the restoration of close diplomatic relations.

"They want Uzbekistan for its vast natural resources � such as oil and gas � and its geopolitical importance," the Tashkent-based expert said. "NATO is already using Uzbek railroads to deliver supplies for its troubled Afghanistan contingents on the cheap. And they are afraid to lose it � they are very unconfident this time." [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Boucher, the assistant US secretary of state, confirmed that the United States remains wary. "It is no secret that we lost a lot of trust in the relationship between the United States and Uzbekistan. � and it’s going to take time and a real effort � to rebuild it," Boucher said during his visit to Tashkent in June.

With the Uzbek government unable to rely on the West for consistent and unwavering geopolitical support, it is unlikely that Karimov will push relations with Russia to the breaking point. "Karimov probably intends to keep both sides hanging to make them nervous and cause them to make him better competing bids," the Tashkent-based analyst said.

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